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Following the second Sahelian famine in 19841985, major investments were made to establish Early Warning
Systems. These systems help to ensure that timely warnings and vulnerability information are available to
decision makers to anticipate and avert food crises. In the recent crisis in the Horn of Africa, alarming levels
of acute malnutrition were documented from March 2010, and by August 2010, an impending food crisis was
forecast. Despite these measures, the situation remained unrecognised, and further deteriorated causing
malnutrition levels to grow in severity and scope. By the time the United Nations officially declared famine on
20 July 2011, and the humanitarian community sluggishly went into response mode, levels of malnutrition
and mortality exceeded catastrophic levels. At this time, an estimated 11 million people were in desperate and
immediate need for food. With warnings of food crises in the Sahel, South Sudan, and forecast of the drought
returning to the Horn, there is an immediate need to institutionalize change in the health response during
humanitarian emergencies. Early warning systems are only effective if they trigger an early response.
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O
n July 21st, 2011, the New York Times headlined
‘Food crisis in Somalia is a famine, U.N. says’.
It was the first famine declared since 19911992
and first significant food crisis in three years. By the time
the major global press began to document the food crisis
in the Horn of Africa (HOA), however, it was already
much too late. Malnutrition and hunger were already
widespread in the region affecting over 10 million people
and communities had started migrating in search of food.
In 19841985, severe famines in Sudan and Ethiopia
prompted the international community to put in place
Early Warning Systems (EWS) to anticipate and avert
future food crises. The Famine Early Warning Systems
Network (FEWS NET), for example, has been in place
since the mid-eighties to ensure that timely and rigorous
early warning and vulnerability information are available.
USAID budgeted $23 million in 2011 for FEWS NET so
that policy makers could readily identify potential threats
to food security. Large investments have also been made
in other EWS such as the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO)’s Global Information and Early
Warning System and World Food Programme’s Vulner-
ability Analysis and Mapping Unit, to name just a few.
The ultimate goal of these EWS is to provide decision
makers with up-to-date information necessary to avert or
mitigate the impact of a food security hazard. FEWS
NET utilizes the Integrated Food Security Phase Classi-
fication (IPC) as a standardized scale to assess the food
security, nutrition and livelihood information to classify
the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. Acute
malnutrition is categorized by the prevalence of global
acute malnutrition (GAM) and severe acute malnutrition.
Under IPC, GAM prevalence between 1530% is con-
sidered a Phase 4 of an ‘emergency’ while prevalence
exceeding 30% is a Phase 5 of a ‘catastrophe’ or a
‘famine’ (1). At Phase 4 levels, the international huma-
nitarian system is triggered into full response mode.
Overall, several of the functioning EWS performed
their task effectively during the recent HOA crisis. As far
back as March 2010, surveys began documenting critical
rates of acute malnutrition and assessing the overall
nutrition status as being critical or very critical across
all urban centers scattered throughout the country (2).
By August 2010, there was concern about severe food
insecurity developing in east Africa and an impending
crisis was forecast. In March 2011, additional warnings
were issued on the alarming situation which was expected
to deteriorate further. By mid-2011 when famine was
finally declared, surveys conducted in the crisis-affected
regions of southern Somalia showed that 13 of 18
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locations had Crude Mortality Rates that exceeded the
emergency threshold of 1/10,000 a day. These figures not
only surpassed the IPC Phase 4 levels, they also exceeded
the IPC Phase 5 or catastrophe or famine level. By this
time, FAO estimated that 11 million people were in
desperate and immediate need for food (3).
Despite the wide availability of up-to-date information
on the deteriorating conditions in late 2010, humanitar-
ian aid was both sporadic and inadequate. The small
increase in aid in early 2011 did little to avert the crisis
that unfolded shortly after (Fig. 1). There was a surge in
aid only when the UN declared famine and media
increased their level of coverage of the HOA crisis.
The fact that the response to the east African famine
was delayed and inadequate did not go unnoticed (4, 5).
In light of the suffering afflicted by the drought and
delay in response, organizations around the world drafted
the Charter to End Extreme Hunger, to seek government
commitment to take the steps to prevent suffering of this
scale from reoccurring (6). The Ministers of International
Development of Norway, United Kingdom, and the
European Commission all declared their support for
the Charter. The non-governmental sector also decried
the delayed response and called for change (7).
Unfortunately, the HOA is not the only region today
where early warnings did not trigger an early response.
In South Sudan, 4.7 million people are expected to be
food insecure during 2012 and conditions are deteriorat-
ing daily (8). An estimated 10 million people are also
facing food insecurity and over 1 million children are at
risk of severe acute malnutrition in the Sahel countries.
Facing a serious food and nutrition crisis, Burkina Faso,
Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger have declared a crisis
and called for international assistance. Exacerbated by
the conflict-induced displacement in Mali, conditions in
the region are worsening and immediate emergency
assistance is required to prevent further increases in the
rates of malnutrition (9, 10).
Admittedly, it is difficult to justify and mobilize the
humanitarian resources when a situation has not reached
critical levels. Yet, if alarms are only sounded when
children and other vulnerable populations are already
suffering from acute malnutrition and mortality is
increasing, the response  however rapid  will be too late.
With the deteriorating food crises in the whole Sahel
region and South Sudan, there is an urgent need to
institutionalize change now.
First, the mechanisms that guide the release of
humanitarian funds must be reviewed and modified.
Currently, appeals are based on what is programmatically
achievable given constraints of access and partners,
rather than what is required to avert disasters. The delay
in response was further compounded by the UN huma-
nitarian appeal timeline which did not align with the
seasons in the HOA. In September 2010 assessments were
carried out before October, when rainy season usually
begins. In turn, the assessment failed to take into account
the failure of rains and also ignored the predictions of
future weather patterns. A further weakness in early
assessments is the potential and bias in responders
conducting their own evaluations. Given the delay
mobilizing funds and getting functional operation on
the ground, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund
(CERF) is a useful tool to jump start response in acute
emergencies. Greater reliance on independent and rigor-
Fig. 1. Horn of Africa humanitarian aid (12).
Source: FTS; updated: 09 March 2012.
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appropriate use of funds from CERF. It also needs to be
better linked to early warning system.
Second, there is a need to operationalize trigger
mechanisms. Certainly, the establishment of standardized
triggers and corresponding thresholds may not always
work; it is, however, an important step that must be taken
to press for early response. Given its mandate to
coordinate humanitarian actors in emergency responses
and recent support of the Charter, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is well-
placed to take leadership in these two initiatives. Member
states should put in place the required conditions to allow
such coordination. The capacity of OCHA to coordinate
has been often questioned but not the pertinent need for
a multi-lateral coordinating body. In-depth reform of
OCHA to strength its credibility, independence and
performance is clearly needed and this key humanitarian
function should be given priority.
In conclusion, timely and effective prevention have
been shown to save lives and money (11). By waiting for a
situation to develop into a crisis, like the one in the HOA,
children develop severe malnutrition that permanently
affect their lives and the stage is set for disease outbreaks,
hikes in mortality rates, social tensions, migration and
conflicts. Beyond these concerns, there is, most impor-
tantly, a moral and ethical imperative for the humanitar-
ian community to act. We must not wait for a situation to
become a catastrophe; early warnings must trigger early
response.
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